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I. INTRODUCTION
Traditionally, entities which provided communications ser-
vices to the public have been labeled common carriers; in contrast,
entities which provided private communications services, normally
available only to a select few, have been labeled non-common car-
riers.1 In recent years, the advent of fiber optic and satellite tech-
nology has caused the Federal Communications Commisssion
(FCC) to circumvent this common carrier/private carrier distinc-
tion, and at the same time avoid onerous federal and state common
carrier regulation, by giving communications service providers2 the
opportunity to classify their new services as private carriers. Real-
1. This Comment will refer to non-common carriers as private carriers.
2. For purposes of this Comment, a communications service provider is an entity or
individual requesting a license from the FCC to provide communications services.
1
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izing that communications service providers now can choose to
transmit simultaneously public or private transmissions through
the same satellite3 or through the same fiber optic cable system,4
the FCC has chosen to classify many new services that look and
act like common carriers as private carriers. From a regulatory per-
spective, regardless of whether the FCC approach is correct, few
deny that the common carrier/private carrier distinction creates
major regulatory problems for the telecommunications industry.
Common carriers are distinguishable from private carriers,
from a regulatory standpoint, in that common carriers are subject
to FCC oversight and private carriers are not.5 Further, common
carriers are subject to intrastate service regulation while, again,
private carriers are not. As a result, both communications entities
and the FCC would prefer to avoid the common carrier classifica-
tion altogether. Unfortunately, there is no regulatory definition of
private carrier. Thus, the courts and the FCC are obligated to com-
pare and contrast private carriers to the most analogous statutorily
defined service-common carrier. Since many entities which re-
quest private carrier service classification look and act like com-
mon carriers, the Communications Act of 1934 supports the belief
that they are common carriers.' Because the distinction between
common carrier and private carrier actually has become the line of
demarcation between the two services, and because this regulatory
definition' is so general in nature, common carrier status is almost
3. Satellite technology allows the operation of simultaneous public and private trans-
missions on different transponders or slots located on the same satellite. See J. ROSENBERG,
DICTIONARY OF COMPUTERS, DATA PROCESSING & TELECOMMUNICATIONS 457-58 (John Wiley &
Sons, ed. 1984).
4. Through one cable, fiber optic systems simultaneously can carry both public and
private transmissions. See J. ROSENBERG, supra note 3, at 196.
5. In accordance with 47 U.S.C. § 303(f) (1982), once an entity is licensed to provide
private carrier service, the FCC will not intervene unless a complaint alleging frequency
interference is filed against a former private carrier service by a competing entity. Although
such disputes do arise, the FCC rarely takes serious disciplinary action in these matters. In
contrast, common carriers are stringently regulated under Title I or 47 C.F.R. § 21 (1987),
which requires common carriers to file tariffs with the FCC.
6. See 47 U.S.C. § 153(h) (1982).
7. There is no way, technically or regulatorily, to redefine common carrier to encom-
pass all services presently labeled as common carrier. Consequently, this Comment proposes
to drop the regulatory definition altogether. In direct contrast, the FCC has attempted to
circumvent the regulatory definition to avoid Title II regulation and state regulation. See In
the Matter of Amendment of parts 2, 73, and 76 of the Commission's Rules to Authorize the
Offering of Data Transmission Services on the Vertical Blanking Interval by TV Stations,
101 F.C.C.2d 973 (1985) [hereinafter Vertical Blanking Interval Decision]. In an article enti-
tled Redefining "Common Carrier": the FCC's Attempt at Deregulation By Redefinition,
1987 DUKE L.J. 501, the author, Phil Nichols, alleges that the FCC is redefining common
carrier. However, since the legal and the technical definition of common carrier are not the
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certain.
Recently, however, the FCC has chosen to circumvent the dis-
tinction by giving communications service providers the opportu-
nity to classify all their new services as private carriers.' This
Comment asserts that the FCC's action is necessary so that com-
munications service providers can avoid Title II common carrier
regulation, as well as state common carrier regulation, and also to
allow the FCC to reduce its oversight function under Title II, thus
reducing its expenditures.
Part II of this Comment provides an overview of the myriad
definitions of common carrier. Part III summarizes the burdens of
common carrier regulation under Title II. Part IV focuses on the
distinction between common carrier and private carrier. Part V ap-
plies the common carrier/private carrier distinction to new commu-
nications services and notes an exception to the distinction. Part
VI discusses non-dominant carrier deregulation and its effect on
the regulation of new and existing common carrier services. Part
VII discusses dominant carrier deregulation, and its effect on the
regulation of new and existing common carrier services. Part VIII
criticizes the FCC's undermining of the NARUC I distinction for
allowing communications service providers to classify their new
services as private carriers to avoid common carrier regulation
under Title II. Part IX assesses the potential for future problems,
such as state regulation, if the courts or Congress decide that the
FCC cannot undermine the distinction as applied to new common
carrier services. Finally, Part X proposes that Congress resolve the
federal and state common carrier regulation problems, as applied
to new services, by dropping the common carrier/private carrier
distinction altogether.
II. THE DEFINITION OF COMMON CARRIER
A. The Communications Act of 1934
The Communications Act of 1934 was enacted "to provide for
the regulation of interstate and foreign communication by wire or
radio and for other purposes."' Congress created the FCC to en-
same, his article begins from a confusing premise. In fact, since redefinition is unattainable
with a regulatory or a technical approach, the FCC only can choose between applying or not
applying the regulatory definition of common carrier.
8. Vertical Blanking Interval Decision, 101 F.C.C.2d at 978.
9. Communications Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-416, 48 Stat. 1064 (1934) (codified as
amended at 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-611 (1982 & Supp. V 1987)).
3
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force the provisions of the Act.1" According to section 3(h), the
FCC must classify "any person engaged as a carrier for hire as a
common carrier."" Section 3(h) states:
"Common carrier" or "carrier" means any person engaged as a
common carrier for hire, in interstate or foreign communication
by wire or radio or in interstate or foreign radio transmission of
energy, except where reference is made to common carriers not
subject to this act; but a person engaged in radio broadcasting
shall not, in so far as such person is so engaged, be deemed a
common carrier."
B. The FCC Regulations
The FCC regulations do not delineate clearly the distinction
between common carriers and private carriers. In its regulations, a
common carrier is defined as "any person engaged in rendering
communication service for hire to the public."' 3 The FCC specifi-
cally included the words "to the public" to distinguish a common
carrier from a private carrier. In effect, if the carrier has not ren-
dered communication service for hire to the public, it is a private
carrier. Unfortunately, this FCC regulatory distinction inade-
quately differentiates between a common carrier and a private car-
rier because the FCC's definition of a common carrier would en-
compass practically all private carriers as well.
III. TITLE II COMMON CARRIER REGULATION
All providers of interstate common carrier sevice must comply
with Title II of the Communications Act of 1934.14 Title II requires
common carriers to file with the Commission a schedule of all
10. 47 U.S.C. § 151 (1982).
11. Id. § 153(h).
12. Id.
13. 47 C.F.R. § 21.2 (1987). In defining common carrier in the Communications Act,
Congress borrowed the definition of common carrier found in the Interstate Commerce Act.
See 49 U.S.C. § 1002(14) (1982).
14. 47 U.S.C. §§ 201 - 224 (1982). In the Communications Act of 1934, Congress origi-
nally enacted the regulations found in Title II to prevent AT&T from engaging in anti-
competitive or monopolistic behavior. See Regulation of Interstate and Foreign Communi-
cations by Wire or Radio and For Other Purposes: Hearings on H.R. 8301 before the
Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934); Regulation of
Interstate and Foreign Communications by Wire or Radio: Hearings on S. 2910 before the
Comm. on Interstate Commerce, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934). Congress believed that it could
prevent AT&T from dominating the communications industry by granting the FCC oversite
authority over all common carriers. Ironically, Title II has created more oversight problems
for the FCC than any other statutorily based regulation.
[Vol. 6:109
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charges made to residential customers and business customers, in-
cluding charges for interconnection of service with connecting com-
mon carriers. 15 If a common carrier decides to increase charges, or
is accused of engaging in discriminatory price-fixing, the FCC may
review the charges in a hearing to determine their reasonable-
ness.' If the commission concludes that the charges are unreason-
able, the common carrier will be sanctioned and customer injuries
will be addressed.
17
Title II also allows the FCC to determine the value of all prop-
erty owned by the common carrier or used in the transmission of
services.' 8 In addition, all proposals made by common carriers for
the construction of new facilities are subject to FCC oversight and
approval.' 9 Further, the FCC can review all contracts entered into
by common carriers and request an accounting of the operations of
all common carrier services.2 0 In short, the FCC may review any-
thing that a common carrier does, whether questionable or not. If
there are enough complaints made by the public against the com-
mon carrier, or if Congress or the courts demand action, the FCC
must take appropriate action or else violate the "public interest,
convenience and necessity" standard implied in the Communica-
tions Act of 1934.21
IV. THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN COMMON CARRIER AND PRIVATE
CARRIER
A. The NARUC I Decision
The distinction between common carriers and private carriers
was first delineated in National Association of Regulatory Utility
Commissioners v. Federal Communications Commission." In
NARUC I, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Cir-
cuit addressed the question of whether to review the FCC's classifi-
cation of the newly permitted Specialized Mobile Radio Systems
(SMRS) as a private carrier. According to the FCC, the SMRS
would be operated by licensees on a "commercial basis to provide
15. 47 U.S.C. § 153(h) (1982).
16. Id. § 204(a).
17. Id. § 205(a).
18. Id. § 213.
19. Id. § 214.
20. Id. § 215.
21. The Communications Act of 1934 requires the FCC to enforce all regulations
which promote "the public interest, convenience and necessity." 47 U.S.C. § 151 (1982).
22. 525 F.2d 630 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 992 (1976) [hereinafter
NARUC I].
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service to third parties."2 Prior to this FCC decision, police de-
partments, taxicab companies, and other dispatch services were
separately licensed to use mobile radio systems.24 Under the FCC's
new proposal, specialized mobile radio operators also would be per-
mitted to share the mobile radio system with the other dispatch
services."5 By classifying SMRS as a private carrier, the FCC
hoped that entrepreneurial interest in the private land mobile ra-
dio industry would increase significantly.26 Moreover, the classifi-
cation of the SMRS as a private carrier would prevent Title II,
Title 111,217 and state regulation from restricting the operation of
SMRS through common carrier regulation. The court held that the
FCC's classification of SMRS as a private carrier was reasonable.2 s
Neither section 3(h) of the Communications Act of 1934 nor
the applicable FCC regulations clearly define the terms "common
carrier" or "private carrier." Consequently, the D.C. Circuit found
it necessary to rely on the common law definition of a public com-
mon carrier in distinguishing a common carrier from a private car-
rier for purposes of communications law.29 The court defined a
common carrier to be a type of service which holds itself out indif-
ferently to serve the eligible user public.30
The court added the words "holding out indifferently" to the
common law definition of a common carrier so as to make a clear
distinction between common carrier and private carrier.3" The
court determined that irrespective of whether the common carrier
held itself out to serve the entire public or the private carrier held
itself out to serve a portion of the public, the distinction would
center on whether the carrier held itself out indifferently.3 2 The
23. NARUC I, 525 F.2d at 634.
24. Id. at 639.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 640.
27. Title III, inter alia, subjects the applicant to a 30-day waiting period prior to
which approval of the application is not possible. 47 U.S.C. § 309(d)(1) (1982). Other parties
may file a petition which alleges that a particular application does not serve the public
interest, convenience, and necessity. Id. Title II applies only to common carriers. See 47
U.S.C. §§ 201-224 (1982).
28. NARUC I, 525 F.2d at 643, 644.
29. Id. at 640. Cf. Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113 (1876) (providing an early example of
price and service regulations placed on common carriers); Propeller Niagra v. Cordes, 62
U.S. 7 (1858) (imposing a greater standard of care on common carriers); American Trucking
Ass'ns, Inc. v. United States, 101 F. Supp. 710 (N.D. Ala. 1951) (upholding as constitution-
ally valid regulations affecting motor carriers).
30. NARUC I, 525 F.2d at 642.
31. Id. at 641.
32. Id. at 642.
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court analogized its distinction between common carrier and pri-
vate carrier to the FCC's public correspondence regulation"3 and
the FCC's private line service regulation,34 noting that because the
FCC uses the "holding out" distinction to distinguish between
public correspondence and private line service, a similar distinc-
tion must hold true when distinguishing between common carrier
and private carrier. Additionally, the court's choice of the term
"indifferently" implies that a common carrier would have to hold
itself out indiscriminately to the entire public. If a carrier held it-
self out indiscriminately to the entire public, regardless of whether
all the public used the service, the service would still be classified
common carrier."5
In upholding as reasonable the FCC's classification of the
SMRS as a private carrier, the NARUC I court applied a two-part
test:
First, whether there will be any legal compulsion . . . to serve
indifferently and, if not, second, whether there are reasons im-
plicit in the nature of SMRS operations to expect an indifferent
holding out to the eligible user public.3"
The court could not find "any reasons implicit in the nature of
SMRS operations to expect an indifferent holding out to the eligi-
ble user public.
'37
The court observed that private carriers, unlike common carri-
ers, generally have stable, long-term relationships with their cus-
tomers. 38 If the SMRS begins actual operations and it does not en-
joy this type of relationship with its customers, the court reserved
the right to "challenge ... the Commission's classification, should
the actual operation of SMRS appear to bring them within com-
mon carrier definition."' 9 Thus, according to NARUC I, if the
SMRS subsequently becomes a common carrier and holds itself
33. Id. at 642, n.63. Public correspondence is defined as a "telecommunication which
the offices and stations, by reason of their being at the disposal of the public, must accept
for transmission." 47 C.F.R. § 21.2 (1987). An example of a public correspondence is a tele-
graph transmission.
34. NARUC I, 525 F.2d at 642. Private line service is defined as "service whereby
facilities for communication between two or more designated points are set aside for the
exclusive use or availability for use of a particular customer and authorized users during
stated periods of time." 47 C.F.R. § 21.2 (1987). An example of a private line service is a
telephone.
35. NARUC I, 525 F.2d at 642.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 643.
39. Id. at 644.
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out to serve indifferently the eligible user public, then the SMRS
will be classified as a common carrier.
The court affirmed the FCC's classification because it could
not find anything in the record, or in the Communication Act's
common carrier definition, to cast doubt on the FCC's conclusion
that the SMRS is not a common carrier but is, instead, a private
carrier. The court explicitly stated, however, that its decision did
not mean the FCC "has any significant discretion in determining
who is a common carrier ....""o The NARUC I court was telling
the FCC that it cannot arbitrarily classify technologies even if its
purpose is to acheive greater administrative efficiency, reduce costs
to the commission, or deregulate the communications industry. In
essence, the distinction would have to be maintained irrespective
of the consequences to the Commission.
V. COMMON CARRIER REGULATION
A. Application of the NARUC I Distinction
In AT&T v. FCC,41 the Second Circuit reviewed the Commis-
sion's use of the NAR UC I distinction to classify as common carri-
ers those entities that resell, to the whole public, communications
services and facilities previously owned by a common carrier with
or without adding value for profit.4 * The court also reviewed the
FCC's decision to classify as private carrier operators those users
who shared communications services and facilities owned by a car-
rier, where each user paid his own costs for his use of the service.
43
The court held that resellers are common carriers because "a com-
mon carrier is one which undertakes indifferently to provide com-
munications service to the public for hire, regardless of the actual
ownership or operation of the facilities involved."44 Sharers were
held to be private carriers where "a bona fide sharing arrangement
exists wherein each participant has a communications need (other
than a need to resell the service to others) for the services and
facilities being shared. ' 45 Further, the court noted that sharing is
by definition a non-profit arrangement and, consequently, "such
activity tends to be private and is unlikely to constitute an under-
40. Id.
41. 572 F.2d 17 (2d Cir. 1978).
42. Id. at 24.
43. Id. at 26.
44. Id. at 24.
45. Id. at 17, 26.
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taking to serve the public indiscriminately for hire."'46
The court also reviewed the FCC's criteria for determining
whether a carrier was a common carrier. In addition to the
NARUC I distinction, the FCC had argued that the profits earned
by the carrier's performance of the carriage services similarly
should be an important factor in the determination. 47 Therefore,
relying on the FCC's recommendation, the court held that "the use
of such criteria was both advisable and proper. ' ' 48 Moreover, the
court noted that "[p]rofit is a significant indicium of common car-
riage; it increases the likelihood that the party making the profit is
also making an indiscriminate offering to the public.
'49
B. Second Computer Inquiry
In its Second Computer Inquiry,5 ° the FCC determined that
the NARUC I distinction was inapplicable to the field of data
processing services." Since data processing services52 provide more
than basic telephone service-for example, they also provide com-
puter linkups to telephone networks-the FCC concluded that Ti-
tle II regulation should not be applicable.53 The FCC argued that
the original intent of the framers of the Communications Act of
1934 was to regulate basic telephone service alone, and because
computer technology is still evolving and is not yet considered a
basic service, Title II regulation should not be allowed to hinder its
growth.
5 4
In addition, the FCC justified its decision not to apply the
NARUC I distinction by arguing that data processing is an excep-
tion to the Title II regulation because it is not explicitly mentioned
in the statute.5 5 According to the FCC, no longer would the
NARUC I distinction be applied; instead, the distinction, and
therefore Title II regulation, would not apply to those technologies
not in existence at the time the Communications Act of 1934 was
46. Id.
47. Id. at 26.
48. Id. at 27.
49. Id. at 26.
50. Second Computer Inquiry, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 77 F.C.C.2d 384
(1980), reconsideration denied, 84 F.C.C.2d 50 (1980) [hereinafter Second Computer
Inquiry].
51. Id. at 431.
52. Data processing services will hereinafter be referred to as "enhanced services."
53. Second Computer Inquiry, 77 F.C.C.2d at 387.
54. Id. at 430, 431.
55. Id. at 430.
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enacted. 6
To prevent AT&T57 and GTE 58 from completely monopolizing
the data communications industry, the FCC required each to set
up a separate subsidiary, totally divested from the parent com-
pany, which would provide the transmission facilities necessary
(through resale) for others to provide enhanced services. 9 In addi-
tion, the subsidiaries themselves also would be allowed to provide
enhanced services. All of these enhanced service providers would
be interconnected with the basic services network which was still
subject to Title I common carrier regulation. The FCC hoped that
the separate subsidiary requirement for AT&T and GTE would
deter anti-competitive behavior. For that reason alone the Com-
mission believed that enhanced services should not be subject to
Title II common carrier regulation."0
VI. THE DEREGULATION OF THE NON-DOMINANT CARRIER
A. The Competitive Carrier Rulemaking
Between 1980 and 1985, the FCC altered its approach to com-
mon carrier regulation in the course of six decisions. 1 These deci-
sions involved rates for competitive common carrier services, as
56. Id. at 430.
57. AT&T was not divested from the Bell operating companies until four years later.
See infra note 109.
58. GTE Sylvania Corporation had invested a great deal of money in the creation of
voice/data integrated networks. Second Computer Inquiry, 77 F.C.C.2d at 471.
59. Id. at 474. Since AT&T and GTE owned most of the equipment and facilities used
to transmit basic telephone services, the FCC decided to set up structural safeguards to
prevent the two corporations from monopolizing the new industry. Id. at 474.
60. Id. at 463, 464.
61. In the Matter of Policy and Rules Concerning Rates for Competitive Common
Carrier Services and Facilities Authorizations Therefor, First Report and Order, 85 F.C.C.2d
1, 52 Rad. Reg.2d (P&F) 215 (1980) [hereinafter First Report]; In the Matter of Policy and
Rules Concerning Rates for Competitive Common Carrier Services and Facilities Authoriza-
tions Therefor, Second Report and Order, 91 F.C.C.2d 59, 52 Rad. Reg.2d (P&F) 187 (1982)
[hereinafter Second Report], reconsideration denied, 93 F.C.C.2d 54, 53 Rad. Reg.2d (P&F)
735 (1983); In the Matter of Policy and Rules Concerning Rates for Competitive Common
Carrier Services and Facilities Authorizations Therefor, Third Report and Order, 48 Fed.
Reg. 46,791 (1983) [hereinafter Third Report]; In the Matter of Policy and Rules Concern-
ing Rates for Competitive Common Carrier Services and Facilities Authorizations Therefor,
Fourth Report and Order, 95 F.C.C.2d 554, 56 Rad. Reg.2d (P&F) 1219 (1983) [hereinafter
Fourth Report]; In the Matter of Policy and Rules Concerning Rates for Competitive Com-
mon Carrier Services and Facilities Authorizations Therefor, Fifth Report and Order, 98
F.C.C.2d 1191, 56 Rad. Reg.2d (P&F) 1204 (1984) [hereinafter Fifth Report]; In the Matter
of Policy and Rules Concerning Rates for Competitive Common Carrier Services and Facili-
ties Authorizations Therefor, Sixth Report and Order, 99 F.C.C.2d 1020, 57 Rad. Reg.2d
(P&F) 1391 (1985), vacated sub nom. MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. Fed. Communica-
tions Comm'n, 58 Rad. Reg.2d (P&F) 871 (D.C. Cir. 1985) [hereinafter Sixth Report].
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well as facility authorizations thereof, and permitted the FCC to
regulate some common carriers under partial Title II regulation
while regulating other common carriers under full Title II
regulation.2
In its First Report, the FCC chose to reclassify all common
carriers according to their overall market share." The dominant
carriers-most importantly AT&T, the dominant carrier in most
major service markets-would continue to be subjected to full Ti-
tle II regulation while the non-dominant carriers- would be sub-
jected to only partial Title II regulation. Because full Title II regu-
lation still would be applied to the dominant carriers, the FCC was
concerned with how to partially deregulate the non-dominant car-
riers without exceeding the statutory restrictions imposed by Title
II under the Communications Act of 1934.64 The FCC's decision to
adopt a streamlined approach-specifically, ignoring sections 203
and 214 with respect to all non-dominant carriers-reflected its
concern that neither the Act nor the case law interpreting the Act
permitted a more expansive type of deregulation.
In the Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking issued in 1981,
the FCC presented two alternative proposals with regard to the
deregulating of the non-dominant carrier. 5 The FCC either could
forebear from applying certain Title II regulations to non-domi-
nant carriers or it could choose to avoid all Title II regulation of
non-dominant carriers by reclassifying them as private carriers. In
effect, forebearing from applying specific Title II regulations would
allow the FCC to exempt non-dominant carriers from specific Title
II regulations while still compelling the non-dominant carriers to
provide service to every person "upon reasonable request"6 and to
be just and reasonable with respect to charges, classifications, regu-
lations, and practices. 6 7 In contrast, a private carrier approach
would allow the FCC to reclassify all non-dominant carriers as pri-
vate carriers thus fully exempting them from Title II regulation."
62. In its First Notice of Inquiry and Proposed Rulemaking, 77 F.C.C.2d 308 (1979),
the Commission suggested that a deregulatory approach should be applied to the interstate
telephone industry to allow those common carriers that did not possess sufficient market
power to compete with the traditional, more established common carriers, such as AT&T.
63. First Report, 85 F.C.C.2d 1 (1980).
64. Communications Act of 1934, tit. II, Pub. L. No. 73-416, 48 Stat. 1064, 1070 (1934)
(codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. §§ 201-224 (1982 & Supp. V 1987)).
65. Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 84 F.C.C.2d 445 (1981) [hereinafter Fur-
ther Notice].
66. 47 U.S.C. § 201(a) (1982).
67. 47 U.S.C. § 201(b) (1982).
68. See Further Notice, 84 F.C.C.2d at 463 for an explanation of this definitional ap-
11
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In its Second Report, the FCC announced that it would accept
the first proposal and, in so doing, agreed to forebear from apply-
ing specific Title II regulations to all non-dominant carriers .6  To
support its position, the FCC relied primarily on section one of the
Communications Act of 1934 which allows the FCC "to make avail-
able . . . to all people of the United States a rapid, efficient, Na-
tion-wide and world-wide wire and radio communication service
with adequate facilities at reasonable charges . . . ."" The FCC
argued that section one allows it to act "in the public interest"
and, therefore, gives it broad power to choose whether or not to
apply Title II common carrier regulation.71 The Commission
claimed that Congress must have intended that section one pro-
vide the FCC leeway in dealing with changing technologies and ex-
panding markets.72 For this reason, the FCC decided that all non-
dominant carriers could refrain from complying with sections 203 73
and 214' if they were resellers of terrestrial common carrier ser-
vices75 or non-satellite services. 76 However, the FCC stated that it
would continue to use the streamlined approach and would "ana-
lyze the appropriateness of forebearance with respect to other car-
riers . .. in further orders.
77
In the Fourth Report and Order, the FCC reclassified all do-
mestic satellite carriers (DOMSATS), miscellaneous common carri-
ers (MCCs), and domestic satellite resellers as non-dominant carri-
ers.78 In a manner akin to the treatment of the non-dominant
proach toward the non-dominant common carrier.
69. Second Report, 91 F.C.C.2d 59 (1982).
70. 47 U.S.C. § 151 (1982).
71. Second Report, 91 F.C.C.2d at 64-66.
72. Second Report, 91 F.C.C.2d at 59.
73. 47 U.S.C. § 203 (1982). Section 203 deals with the filing of tariffs.
74. 47 U.S.C. § 214 (1982). Section 214 deals with the construction of new facilities
and the authorizations required from the FCC before construction, and eventually service,
can begin or end.
75. Common carrier satellite services are regulated under Title II of the Communica-
tions Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-416, 48 Stat. 1064, 1070 (1934) (codified as amended at 47
U.S.C. §§ 201-224 (1982 & Supp. V 1987)), and under the Communications Satellite Act of
1962, Pub. L. No. 87-624, 76 Stat. 419 (1962) (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. §§ 701-757
(1982 & Supp. V 1987)).
76. Second Report, 91 F.C.C.2d at 59, 73.
77. Fifth Report, 98 F.C.C.2d 1191, n.1 (1984) (citing Second Report, 91 F.C.C.2d 59,
62 (1982), reconsideration denied, 93 F.C.C.2d 54 (1983)). It is important to note that the
FCC determinations, in this context, are subject to judicial review. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559
(1982).
78. Fourth Report, 92 F.C.C.2d 554 (1983). To rationalize the reclassification of all
DOMSAT and DOMSAT resellers as non-dominant carriers, the FCC reiterated the market
power concept with an emphasis on its relationship to economic rents. Id. at 554.
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terrestrial carriers, these common carriers would be deregulated
using the streamlined approach. Moreover, the Fourth Report per-
mitted carriers classified as non-dominant, the specialized common
carriers, and the resellers,79 to forebear from complying with sec-
tions 20380 and 21481 of title II.
In the Fifth Report and Order,82 the FCC replaced its stream-
lined approach with a permissive forebearance approach which
would allow all non-dominant carriers to choose whether or not to
file tariffs.83 Specifically, the DOMSAT carriers, MCCs, "all do-
mestic, interstate, inter-exchange services of carriers affiliated with
exchange telephone companies, 8 4 and carriers providing domestic
interstate and inter-exchange digital transmission networks could
forebear from filing tariffs.8
In the Sixth Report and Order, the FCC imposed a mandatory
forebearance on all non-dominant carriers.88 The ruling provided
that all non-dominant carriers would have to forebear from filing
tariffs. In effect, this was a radical departure from previous FCC
policy. Before the FCC issued the Sixth Report, the permissive
forebearance approach permitted non-dominant carriers either to
continue or discontinue to file tariffs or, alternatively, to enter into
private contracts with their customers as the carriers wished.
Under the mandatory forebearance approach, the non-dominant
carriers could not file tariffs under any circumstance. Conse-
quently, since many non-dominant carriers wanted to continue fil-
ing tariffs, there were a great number of challenges to this
decision.
8 7
79. In the Fourth Report, 95 F.C.C.2d at 554, specialized common carriers and resel-
lers were classified as non-dominant.
80. 47 U.S.C. § 203 (1982).
81. 47 U.S.C. § 214 (1982).
82. Fifth Report, 98 F.C.C.2d 1191, n.1 (1984).
83. "The tariff is [simply] a contract between the customer and the telecommunica-
tions facility." J. ROSENBERG, supra note 3, at 530. Most non-dominant carriers, such as
MCI and Sprint, would rather continue to file tariffs to prevent AT&T from one day chal-
lenging their own filing of tariffs. The non-dominant carriers believe that competition will
be maintained as long as AT&T is subject to full Title II regulation.
84. MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. Fed. Communications Comm'n, 58 Rad. Reg.2d
(P&F) 871, 874 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (citing Fifth Report, 98 F.C.C.2d at 1209-10). [hereinafter
MCI v. FCC].
85. See id.
86. Sixth Report, 57 Rad. Reg.2d (P&F) 1391 (1985). This approach originally was
suggested in the Fourth Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking. Id. at 1393 (citing Fourth
Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 49 Fed. Reg. 11,856 (1984) [hereinafter Fourth
Further Notice]).
87. Sixth Report, 57 Rad. Reg.2d (P&F) at 1393 (citing Fourth Further Notice, 49
Fed. Reg. 11,856, 11,857 (1984)). MCI Telecommunications Corporation (MCI), as well as
13
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B. MCI v. FCC
In MCI v. FCC,"" the D.C. Circuit overruled the FCC's deci-
sion to apply mandatory forebearance to all non-dominant carriers.
Although the court reviewed all comments made by all parties in-
volved in the Sixth Report,89 the principal issue before the court
was the narrow question of whether the FCC had the authority
under section 203(a) of the Communications Act of 1934 to make
forebearance mandatory for all non-dominant carriers.9 No court
ever had reviewed the FCC's competitive carrier rulemaking; con-
sequently, this decision sent a message to the FCC that section
203(a) of the Communications Act of 1934 allows only a permissive
forebearance approach toward non-dominant carriers.
In the court's opinion, the mandatory forebearance approach
was a direct violation of section 203(a) of the Communications Act
of 1934 which provides:
Every common carrier, except connecting carriers, shall, within
such reasonable time as the FCC shall designate, file with the
FCC and print and keep open for public inspection schedules
showing all charges for itself and its connecting carriers . . and
showing the classifications, practices and regulations affecting
such charges. 1
The court interpreted the phrase "every common carrier except
connecting carriers" as commanding all common carriers to abide
by this statutory language.92 Citing Supreme Court precedent, the
court held that no leeway would be given to the FCC on the issue
of mandatory forebearance9 3
The court rejected the FCC's argument that section 203(b)(2)
of the Communications Act of 1934 granted the Commission broad
discretion to modify the Title II regulations. 4 Section 203(b)(2)
states:
The Commission may, in its discretion and for good cause
other non-dominant interstate telephone carriers, wanted to continue filing tariffs. Conse-
quently, they demanded judicial review of the Sixth Report which also had required that
they cancel existing tariffs within six months of the Report's effective date. MCI v. FCC, 58
Rad. Reg.2d (P&F) 871 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
88. MCI, 58 Rad. Reg.2d (P&F) 871 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
89. For a detailed discussion of these arguments, see MCI, 58 Rad.Reg.2d at 874.
90. MCI, 58 Rad. Reg.2d at 871.
91. 47 U.S.C. § 203(a) (1982).
92. MCI, 58 Rad. Reg.2d at 876 (interpreting 47 U.S.C. § 203(a) (1982)).
93. MCI, 58 Rad. Reg.2d at 876 (citing Consumer Product Safety Comm'n v. GTE
Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 108 (1980); Escoe v. Zerbst, 295 U.S. 490, 493 (1935)).
94. Id. at 876.
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shown, modify any requirement made by or under the authority
of this section either in particular instances or by general order
applicable to special circumstances or conditions except that the
FCC may not require the notice period ... to be more than
ninety days. 5
Relying on the broad language in section 203(b)(2), the FCC ar-
gued that mandatory forebearance should be considered "a special
circumstance" because the proposal would eliminate costs to the
FCC and the non-dominant carriers, thereby reducing administra-
tive burdens imposed by tariff filings.98
The court stated that the term "modify" means "to alter, to
change an incidental or subordinate feature; enlarge, extend, limit
or reduce but not to eliminate," as the Commission argued.97 How-
ever, the court rejected the Commission's argument that the
phrase "to modify in particular circumstances or special circum-
stances or conditions"9 gave the Commission the statutory right to
force non-dominant carriers to forebear from filing tariffs. 9 More-
over, the court found that the Commission's position was not sup-
ported by Title II, prior FCC decisions, or precedent.100
Next, the court addressed the FCC's alternative argument that
the Commission can prevent non-dominant carriers from filing tar-
iffs if it is in the public interest to do so. Relying on four decisions,
each referring to private carrier offerings,' 10 the Commission ar-
gued that since the Communications Act of 1934 allowed the FCC
to avoid Title II common carrier regulation by classifying services
as private carriers, the Act also should allow the FCC to prohibit
tariff filings by non-dominant carriers. 02 The court found the issue
not to be whether to classify a carrier as a common carrier or a
95. 47 U.S.C. § 203(b)(2) (1982).
96. MCI, 58 Rad. Reg.2d at 876.
97. Id. at 877.
98. Id. (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 203(b)(2) (1982)).
99. Id. at 877.
100. Id. at 877 (citing AT&T v. Fed. Communications Comm'n, 487 F.2d 865 (2d Cir.
1973)). The court reemphasized that modification of tariff filing requirements for adminsis-
trative purposes is acceptable. Id. at 878. However, the FCC simply cannot stop tariff filings
by non-dominant carriers through an agency order. In short, section 203(a) of the Communi-
cations Act of 1934 supports permissive forebearance but not mandatory forebearance.
101. MCI, 58 Rad. Reg.2d (P&F) at 878 (citing Wold Communications, Inc. v. Fed.
Communications Comm'n, 735 F.2d 1465 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Computer and Communications
Industry Ass'n v. Fed. Communications Comm'n, 693 F.2d 198 (D.C. Cir. 1982), cert. de-
nied, 462 U.S. 938 (1983); Western Union Telegraph v. Fed. Communications Comm'n, 674
F.2d 160 (D.C. Cir. 1982); and Philadelphia Television Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 359 F.2d
282 (D.C. Cir. 1961)).
102. MCI, 58 Rad. Reg.2d at 878.
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private carrier but, instead, whether non-dominant carriers must
file tariffs.10 3 The court noted that "to protect the public interest,
the agency is entitled to some leeway in choosing which jurisdic-
tional base and which regulatory tools will be most effective in ad-
vancing the Congressional objective."' 4 Nonetheless, the court
warned that the FCC will not be allowed to totally deregulate com-
mon carrier service provided by non-dominant carriers regardless
of their reasons.
In its final argument, the FCC attacked Title II as an outdated
method of common carrier regulation. Essentially, the FCC as-
serted that "marketplace forces" would force common carriers to
charge "just and reasonable rates."'1 5 However, citing as an exam-
ple its transportation industry decisions where the court refused to
rule on tariff exemptions for all transportation carriers,,0 6 the court
concluded that the fate of Title II common carrier regulation will
have to lie with Congress.0 7
VII. THE DEREGULATION OF THE DOMINANT CARRIER
A. Third Computer Inquiry
In recent years, the courts have expressed a great deal of in-
terest in the dominant common carriers, particularly AT&T. 8 In
addition, the 1984 divestiture of AT&T's long distance operations
from its local operating companies,' coupled with the increase in
suppliers of communications services, has allowed the FCC to be-
gin its divestiture of the dominant common carriers, specifically
AT&T and the Bell Operating Companies (B.O.C.). To achieve this
deregulatory goal, the FCC decided to proceed more cautiously
103. Id. at 879.
104. Id. at 878 (citing Philadelphia Television Broadcasting Co., 359 F.2d at 284).
105. MCI, 58 Rad. Reg.2d at 879.
106. Central & Southern Motor Freight Tariff Ass'n v. United States, 757 F.2d 301
(D.C. Cir. 1985)(per curiam); National Small Shipments Traffic Conference, Inc. v. Civil
Aeronautics Bd., 618 F.2d 819 (D.C. Cir. 1980); Brae Corp. v. United States, 740 F.2d 1023
(D.C. Cir. 1984).
107. MCI, 58 Rad. Reg.2d at 880.
108. In the Matter of Policy and Rules Concerning Rates for Dominant Carriers, No-
tice of Proposed Rulemaking, 2 FCC Rcd 5208, 5224 n.38 (citing United States v. AT&T,
552 F. Supp. 131 (D.C. Cir. 1982), aff'd sub nom. Maryland v. United States, 460 U.S. 1001
(1983)) [hereinafter Notice of Proposed Rulemaking].
109. In 1984, the Bell Operating Companies (B.O.C.s) were divested from AT&T. This
brought to a close the antitrust suit brought by the Department of Justice against AT&T.
See Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 2 FCC Rcd at 5210. See also Illinois Bell Telephone
Co. v. Fed. Comunications Comm'n, 56 Rad. Reg.2d (P&F) 69 (7th Cir. 1984) (affirming the
FCC's order requiring the divested B.O.C.s to form separate subsidiaries to engage in the
marketing of customer premises equipment).
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than it had in the competitive carrier rulemaking. 110
In the Third Computer Inquiry,"' the FCC reviewed the
structural safeguards that had been set up between basic services
and enhanced services in the Second Computer Inquiry.1
2 Origi-
nally, these safeguards were set up to prevent AT&T from engag-
ing in anti-competitive activities." 3 However, the FCC soon began
to feel that the safeguards were hurting the consumer because they
were less efficient and lacked creativity.
After the divestiture of AT&T, there were more companies
that could offer enhanced services, creating a more complicated
system of procedural safeguards. For example, there were many
non-dominant carriers leasing AT&T phone lines and leasing and
interconnecting with local exchange carriers-viz., the B.O.C.s-to
provide data communications." 4 Consequently, the FCC proposed
an alternative deregulatory approach." 5 In its new approach, the
FCC proposed to maintain the distinction between basic and en-
hanced services but to drop the separate subsidiary requirement as
applied to AT&T and the B.O.C.s."16 In its place, AT&T and the
B.O.C.s would be allowed to offer specific enhanced services if they
could demonstrate: (1) that all other enhanced service providers
were allowed equal access to the facilities owned by AT&T and the
B.O.C.s; (2) that prices charged for interconnection to facilities
would be the same for all enhanced service providers; and (3) that
all equipment and transmission quality was equal to that used by
AT&T and the B.O.C.s. 1 7 Next, AT&T and the B.O.C.s would at-
110. Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 2 FCC Red at 5210 (citing MCI v. FCC, 58 Rad.
Reg.2d (P&F) at 877).
111. Amendment of section 64.702 of the Commission's Rules and Regulations (Third
Computer Inquiry), Report and Order, 104 F.C.C.2d 958, 60 Rad. Reg.2d (P&F) 603, (1986),
clarified on reconsideration, 2 FCC Rcd 3035 (1987) [hereinafter Third Computer Inquiry].
112. See Second Computer Inquiry, 77 F.C.C.2d 384 (1980).
113. Second Computer Inquiry, 77 F.C.C.2d at 469, 485. The structural separation
between enhanced services and basic services prevented common carriers from taking over
data processing markets by utilizing profits from their basic services. Moreover, the distinc-
tion allowed the Commission to scrutinize the cost of service, accounting methods, and the
actual providing of the service separate from the parent company and any Title II
regulation.
114. MCI, Sprint, and Contel are all examples of non-dominant carrierg. Fourth Re-
port, 95 F.C.C.2d 554, 557 (1983).
115. For a more detailed discussion of the Commission's alternative deregulatory ap-
proach and the rationale behind it, see Third Computer Inquiry, 60 Rad. Reg.2d at 667-679;
Frieden, A Deregulatory Dilemma, 38 FED. COMM. L.J. 383 (1987).
116. See Second Computer Inquiry, 77 F.C.C.2d 430, 431 (1980).
117. Third Computer Inquiry, 60 Rad. Reg.2d (P&F) at 647. This plan, otherwise
known as Comparably Efficient Interconnection or CEI, will remain in effect until AT&T
and the B.O.C.s submit acceptable open network architecture plans.
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tempt to devise a plan whereby all carriers not only could offer
enhanced services on an "equal access basis" but could achieve to-
tal interconnection with basic service networks as well.
118
However, even assuming AT&T and the Bell Operating Com-
panies create an acceptable plan, there are still a number of
problems with implementing this deregulatory approach in the
data processing communications industry. First, the FCC is unwill-
ing to allow a permissive forebearance approach toward the filing
of tariffs by the dominant carriers, that is, to permit dominant car-
riers the choice of filing tariffs or not filing tariffs." 9 The courts
also are unwilling to require non-dominant carriers to forebear
from filing tariffs. 2 ° Moreover, the Department of Justice has pro-
hibited the offering of information services by the B.O.C.s unless
the cross-ownership ban is lifted.' 2 ' Additionally, there is uncer-
tainty as to how much the data processing communications market
has changed. Arguably, the structural separation between the basic
service and the enhanced service market did serve a useful purpose
and should have been maintained.
The deregulation of the dominant carrier is the next step to-
ward the FCC's deregulation of the common carrier; still, it is
questionable whether the FCC has chosen the correct approach in
deregulating the data processing communications industry. 22
B. The AT&T Price Cap Appoach
In a 1987 notice of proposed rulemaking, the FCC proposed to
replace its cost of service regulatory approach toward the domi-
118. AT&T and the B.O.C.s also will have to allocate joint and common costs, disclose
network information, and access customer propriety network information. Third Computer
Inquiry, 60 Rad. Reg.2d (P&F) 603, 676 (1986).
119. First Report, 85 F.C.C.2d 1, 6 (1980).
120. The Commission argued in its competitive carrier rulemaking that Congress cre-
ated Title II to apply to the traditional common carriers. Therefore, in order to maintain its
argument to allow non-dominant common carriers to permissively forebear, the traditional
common carriers must continue to be subjected to full Title II regulation.
121. Judge Harold Greene, the U.S. district judge presiding over the AT&T divesti-
ture, refuses to grant a line of business waiver to allow the B.O.C.s to provide information
services to their customers. One minor problem with the implementation of Open Network
Architecture is that AT&T, the Bell operating companies, and the FCC are having difficulty
distinguishing between information services and enhanced services as defined in Judge
Greene's Modification of Final Judgment Order. See Harper, F.C.C. Unveils Computer III;
Telcos Cautiously Optimistic, TELEPHONY, May 26, 1986, at 12.
122. The FCC already has rejected the possibility of replacing the basic/enhanced ser-
vices dichotomy with an economic analysis approach. See Third Computer Inquiry, 60 Rad.
Reg.2d at 603, 642 (1986), clarified on reconsideration, 2 FCC Rcd 3035 (1987).
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nant carrier, AT&T, with a price cap approach. 2 ' In effect, this
price cap approach would set a ceiling on the prices that a domi-
nant carrier such as AT&T could charge its customers. As a result,
both consumers and the dominant carrier would benefit from the
price cap approach. 124 The dominant carrier would benefit by
keeping the difference between his cost of providing the service
and the industry price cap level.12 5 Consumers, on the other hand,
no longer would have to worry about dominant carriers shifting to
the less competitive markets the high costs associated with provid-
ing business in the more competitive commercial markets, solely to
increase their profit margins.'26 Furthermore, according to the
FCC, the price cap approach would alleviate the substantial ad-
ministrative burdens in employing the cost-of-service approach.
27
Although there are clear advantages to employing the price
cap approach, implementing it would create five major problems.
First, it is questionable whether the FCC would have the statutory
authority to implement such an approach. 8 Second, assuming the
FCC did have the authority under Title II, it is not clear what
method of implementation the Commission should use. 2 ' Third, it
is debatable whether the price cap approach would solve the prob-
lem of anti-competitive behavior. 30 Fourth, it is unclear how the
FCC would adjust price cap levels to reflect changes in the commu-
123. In the Matter of Policy and Rules Concerning Rates for Dominant Carriers, 2
FCC Rcd 5208 (1987) Ihereinafter Rates for Dominant Carriers].
124. See id. at 5213.
125. See id.
126. Id. at 5213.
127. Id. at 5214. For a detailed discussion of cost-of- service regulation, see id. at 5209-
11.
128. The Commission claims that it is under "no legal obligation to continue to use
cost-of-service regulation, particularly if another method of regulation will lead to just and
reasonable rates at a lower cost to society." Id. at 5208 (citing 47 U.S.C. §§ 151, 201(b), and
202(a)).
129. Before implementing a price cap approach, the Commission must decide to which
services it will apply the price cap approach. See Rates for Dominant Common Carriers, 2
FCC Rcd 5208, 5214 (1987). The Commission concedes that, regardless of the price cap
approach implemented, the dominant carriers must continue to file tariffs and, in accor-
dance with Title II regulation, their rates must be "just, reasonable and not discriminatory."
Id. at 5214. However, the Commission does leave open the possibility of a streamlined ap-
proach toward those dominant common carriers that want to set rates below the price cap.
Id. Nonetheless, if rates were set above the price cap, those dominant common carriers
would be subject to full Title II regulation. Id.
130. The Commission is concerned that the price cap approach would allow AT&T, in
a market in which it has an 80% share, to purposely lower its prices for service below the
price cap to destroy the other service providers. Id. at 5216. The Commission's solution to
combat predatory pricing is price floors. Id. These price floors would prevent AT&T from
setting prices below a certain level. Id.
19
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nications market.' 3 ' Finally, it is far from unequivocal whether the
price cap approach would affect present FCC policies, rules, and
regulations.132
On March 1, 1989, with the assistance of Congress,'"3 the pub-
lic,' 34 and the Common Carrier Bureau, FCC Chairman Dennis R.
Patrick was able to respond to all of these concerns. Testifying
before the Communications Subcommittee of the Senate Commit-
tee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, Chairman Patrick
outlined his final price cap proposal for AT&T.1 5 This proposal
includes, first, replacing rate of return regulation "with incentive
regulation for all dominant carriers," and secondly, adopting a four
year plan to "cap AT&T's prices to require 3% reductions in real
terms each year, after adjustment for exogenous cost changes
outside of AT&T's control."' 36
Chairman Patrick's approach should solve the problem of
anti-competitive behavior with which the FCC was so concerned in
its 1987 Notice of Proposed Rulemaking. 3 7 In effect, each separate
AT&T service would have its own price cap which would prevent
AT&T from overcharging consumers or small businesses for dis-
counts given to big business, as has been done in the past. 38 Since
Chairman Patrick has proposed a four year plan, the AT&T price
cap level can be adjusted as the communications market further
evolves. 39 Moreover, Patrick cleverly avoided having to assess
whether price caps would violate Title II when he proposed that
his price cap plan be implemented through "the Title II tariffing
process."' 4 °
As expected, on March 16, 1989, the FCC voted to approve
131. Id. at 5218.
132. The Commission cited as one example the lowering of the structural separation
between basic and enhanced services. See Id. at 5220, 5221.
133. Congress sent the Commission a memorandum seeking information about the
price cap proposal and also conducted five hearings on the issue. See F.C.C. Price Cap Pro-
ceeding: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Communications of the Senate Comm. on Com-
merce, Science, and Transportation, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (March 1, 1989) (Statement of
Dennis R. Patrick, Chairman, FCC) [hereinafter Statement of Dennis R. Patrick].
134. The Commission received more than 11,000 comments and reply comments to its
price cap proposal. Id. at 6.
135. Chairman Patrick's proposal also recommends the eventual implementation of a
price cap plan for the Bell Operating Companies. Id. at 5-6.
136. Id. at 7.
137. See Rates for Dominant Carriers, 2 FCC Rcd 5208 (1987).
138. In other words, the Chairman's approach will prevent predatory pricing.
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Chairman Patrick's price cap plan.'41 The AT&T price cap plan
was slated to go into effect on July 1, 1989.142 However, the extent
to which price caps will affect the constantly changing telecommu-
nications market remains to be seen.
C. The Broadcasting/Telco Controversy
1. Public Interest
Currently, cable television only offers the viewer the choice of
news, sporting events, and movies. However, suppose that the
viewer could pick any movie or watch any sporting event as it was
happening from around the world simply by pushing a button on a
touchtone telephone. This could become reality by the year 2000,
as every channel on the standard television set may be in use.
143
Through switched fiber optic cable, the viewer might be able to
watch live news televised abroad, request delivery of any newspa-
per in the world via the television screen, participate directly in
game shows, or play video games without the extra equipment
presently needed. Further, fiber optic cable may allow the sports
fan to instantly replay the sporting event, or protest a referee's
call; the fan's input would be fed through a central computer di-
rectly to the sportscaster. Eventually, with the installation of dual
telephone/television switched fiber optic cable service, the viewer
will be able to receive all of these services and more.
2. The Commission's Interest
If the FCC continues its deregulatory approach toward the
telephone companies, the telcos could gain control of the broad-
cast industry by the year 2000. In a recent interview, outgoing Na-
tional Cable Television Association President James Mooney 145 as-
serted that telco entry into the broadcast industry would have
serious repercussions for the broadcast industry as a whole. Al-
though Mooney quickly acknowledged that he believed telco entry
141. On March 16, 1989 the FCC voted unanimously to approve the price cap plan.
Telephone interview with Mary Brown, FCC attorney (Sept. 21, 1989).
142. Statement of Dennis R. Patrick, supra note 133, at 8.
143. According to the National Cable Television Association, "telcos could become gi-
ant TV stations capable of using their monopoly revenues to finance their entry into the
business and crush competition." Common Carrier Week, Jan. 9, 1989, at 7.
144. "Telephone companies" and "telcos" refer to the Bell Operating Companies.
145. See The Grace Under Pressure of Jim Mooney, BROADCASTING, May 22, 1989, at
35 [hereinafter Jim Mooney].
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would not occur in the near future, 4" he did offer his views on the
effect of price caps on the entry of the telcos into the broadcast
industry, on FCC support for telco entry, and on potential con-
sumer backlash due to the increase in cost for providing dual
broadcast/telco service. 47 Mooney contends that with the imple-
mentation of price caps, the telcos might not be so enthusiastic to
enter the broadcast industry.'48 Moreover, he asserts that the cost
of building fiber optic plants simply would be too expensive. 149 In
addition, he claims that since the consumer already has both tele-
phone and television service, he would probably be very reluctant
to pay the additional costs associated with the dual service.
150
Although Mooney may be correct in his assertions, he fails to
emphasize the serious consequences that FCC support for telco en-
try would have on broadcast itself.15' Mooney points out that many
at the FCC believe that switched fiber optic cable made available
to every household in America would take away the need for
broadcast towers. 152 As a result, there would be more spectrum
available for other uses. 53 Arguably, this assertion could be cor-
rect. However, if the Commission is promoting telco entry into the
broadcast market, it might be more important to ask why the
merger of broadcast and common carrier is even in the public in-
terest? Since the Communications Act of 1934 specifically excludes
broadcast from its definition of common carrier, why should com-
mon carriers be allowed to take over and destroy the broadcast in-
dustry? In essence, we must determine whether the advances of
technology will be allowed to ruin a whole medium of communica-
tion? When the FCC allows the telcos entry into the broadcast in-
dustry, the FCC will realize that common carrier deregulation may
have gone too far.
54
146. Telcos presently cannot enter into the broadcast market because telco/broadcast
violates the Communications Act of 1934, and cable/telco crossownership violates the Cable
Communications Policy Act of 1984, the FCC regulations, and Judge Harold Greene's
AT&T modification of final judgment order. See 47 U.S.C. § 613 (1982); 552 F. Supp. 131
(D.D.C. 1982), aff'd sub nom. Maryland v. United States, 460 U.S. 1001 (1983).







154. If Congress would propose to reorganize the Bureau of Mass Media to allow the
Common Carrier Bureau to handle complaints and investigations for broadcast television,
the Commission would realize that common carrier deregulation had gone too far.
(Vol. 6:109
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VIII. THE UNDERMINING OF THE NARUC I DISTINCTION
To avoid Title II Common Carrier regulation, and thereby
achieve its deregulatory goals, the FCC must find an alternative
approach to the dominant/non-dominant classification and, more
importantly, to the NARUC I distinction.155 Because the FCC
could not avoid the NARUC I distinction, it chose to incorporate
the distinction into criteria that would classify a carrier as a pri-
vate carrier.15' The FCC knew it could not disregard NARUC I
and give itself "an unfettered ... discretion ... to confer or not
confer common carrier status on a given entity, depending upon
the regulatory goals it seeks to achieve. ' 157 Therefore, the FCC's
solution was to utilize the NAR UC I distinction as part of the cri-
teria necessary to classify a carrier as a private carrier. 58
In the transponder sales decision, 159 the domestic satellite cor-
porations wanted to sell transponders as private carriers. Since a
transponder is a slot on a satellite which operates on a frequency
licensed for use by an individual for his own private transmissions,
or for public transmissions from the satellite to his subscribers be-
low, technically, transponder service could be operated on a private
carrier basis. Indeed, the FCC held that "the transponders could
be sold as private carriers because the nature of transponder ser-
vice is not such that it would be expected to be provided uniformly
and indiscriminately to all potential customers on a common car-
rier basis."' 10 Although this is true, the facts in this case suggest
that the domestic satellite corporations probably would sell their
transponder service indiscriminately to all private companies wish-
ing to use satellites for business purposes.'"' Since DOMSATs
could make an enormous profit on the sale of the transponder ser-
vice, these transponders should have been classified as common
carriers and therefore subject to Title II regulation. The FCC's de-
cision to go beyond the NARUC I distinction was done more to
promote administrative efficiency than anything else. Utilizing
155. NARUC 1, 525 F.2d at 642, held that if a carrier holds itself out indifferently to
the public, it is classified as a common carrier.
156. See Vertical Blanking Interval Decision, 101 F.C.C.2d 973 (1985).
157. NARUC 1, 525 F.2d at 644.
158. See Vertical Blanking Interval Decision, 101 F.C.C.2d 973 (1985).
159. Domestic Fixed Satellite Transponder Sales, 90 F.C.C.2d 1238 (1982) (FCC failed
to apply the NARUC I distinction in a proper manner for the first time.).
160. Id. at 1256.
161. Since satellites do not have a long life span-orbit begins to decay after 7
years-DOMSAT owners will sell the service to anyone that wants it. The most important
goal is to fill up all transponders while the satellite is operational. Satellites: Flying To-
wards the Future, BROADCASTING, July 17, 1989, at 35, 37.
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dicta in the NARUC I decision, the FCC cleverly managed to ig-
nore the distinction between common carrier and private carrier.
162
In its interpretation of the facts, the FCC concluded that "[s]table,
long term contractual offerings to individual customers of techni-
cally and operationally distinct portions of a satellite system fall
far short of the indiscriminate holding out contemplated in the
NARUC I decision."'6'
If the FCC properly had applied the NARUC I distinction, the
domestic satellite corporations would have been subjected to Title
II common carrier regulation in the sale of their transponders. This
decision suggests, however, that transponders sold by domestic sat-
ellite corporations to public corporations using the transponders
for private company business, no longer will be subject to common
carrier regulation. 64
In the Vertical Blanking Interval decision, 6 5 the FCC decided
that it would allow paging and other data transmission services, in
addition to teletext, 66 to utilize the television video signal on a
secondary basis to broadcast television signals. More importantly,
the FCC concluded that it would no longer apply the NARUC I
distinction to classify services allowed to use the vertical blanking
interval on a secondary basis. 6 7 Instead, the FCC made it very dif-
ficult to classify a service as a common carrier. The Commission
held that "specific services are not to be classified as either com-
mon carrier or private carrier offerings.'16 8 "Instead, services are to
be classified according to the criteria established by the court in
the NARUC I decision. "169 The FCC, in the Vertical Blanking In-
terval Decision, concluded that the NARUC I court found the fol-
lowing factors to be evidence of non-common carriage: "1) [t]he
establishment of medium-to-long term contractual relationships
with customers, 2) [a] relatively stable clientele base, 3) [n]ot hold-
ing out facilities indifferently, and 4) [t]he selection of clients on a
162. Domestic Fixed-Satellite Transponder Sales, 90 F.C.C.2d at 1255-57.
163. Id. at 1257.
164. Id. at 1244-45. Clearly, this decision worried those corporations that wanted to
buy or lease transponders on the domestic satellites in order to serve the eligible user public.
They were worried because they believed that the corporations which wanted to utilize the
service for private interests would buy up all of the transponders as they would not have to
worry about common carrier regulation.
165. Vertical Blanking Interval Decision, 101 F.C.C.2d 973 (1985).
166. "Teletext is .... a data system for the transmission of textual and graphic infor-
mation intended for display on viewing screens." Id. at 973.
167. Id. at 976.
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highly individualized basis. "170
Clearly, the FCC does not want to utilize the NARUC I dis-
tinction to classify a service as common carrier or private carrier.
Instead, it will look to the criteria enumerated in NAR UC I to de-
cide whether the service is private carrier. The FCC is suggesting
that the new service will be automatically labeled private carrier so
long as one of the four criteria mentioned in NAR UC I is satisfied.
Under this approach, the communications service provider will
have little difficulty having his service classified private carrier.
In effect, the FCC is giving the carrier the opportunity to clas-
sify its services private carrier. If the carrier satisfies one of the
four criteria, its services will be labeled private carrier. Before, if a
carrier held himself out indifferently to serve the eligible user pub-
lic, its services would have been classified common carrier. Thus,
the carrier now can hold himself out to serve the eligible user pub-
lic and still avoid Title II common carrier regulation by satisfying
any of the NAR UC I criteria. As a result, the carrier need only





Although the FCC has achieved its goal of partially deregulat-
ing the non-dominant carriers, and despite its continued deregula-
tion of the dominant carriers, state common carrier regulation
should not be ignored. The FCC imposition of less restrictive fed-
eral regulatory burdens on common carriers is wholly irrelevant to
the issue of state common carrier regulation. State public utility
commissions place heavy burdens on common carriers providing
intrastate service reasoning that common carriers can afford these
170. Id. In two recent decisions, the Commission has utilized the NARUC I criteria to
allow the Multipoint Distribution Service (a transmitter located on a fixed site that can
transmit communications services to many subscribers) and the Fiber Optic Service (a cable
with the capacity of sending enormous amounts of data to the home or business presently
through the telephone system) to be classified as private carriers. See In the Matter of Divi-
sion to Part 21 of the Commissions Rules Regarding Multipoint Distribution Service, Re-
port and Order, 2 F.C.C.2d 4251 (1987) (allowing MDS licensees to define themselves as
private carriers); In the Matter of Norlight, Declaratory Ruling, 2 F.C.C.2d 132 (1987) (pro-
viding Fiber Optic Service licensees the option of defining themselves as private carriers).
171. Simply stated, a carrier now can enter into long term contracts or maintain stable
relationships with a few selected customers. Nonetheless, in NARUC I, the court had distin-
guished between common carriers and private carriers by defining a common carrier using
the holding out distinction enumerated in the Communications Act of 1934. NARUC I, 525
F.2d at 642. Here, the FCC had done the exact opposite by emphasizing the Vertical Blank-
ing Interval criteria, originally only dicta mentioned in NARUC I, which defines the carrier
from a private carrier standpoint. Vertical Blanking Interval Decision, 101 F.C.C.2d at 976.
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burdens and that public utility charges help to insure the growth
and maintenance of the state.172 For this reason alone, state com-
mon carrier regulation is much more severe than Title II common
carrier regulation.
173
By giving the communications service providers the opportu-
nity to classify practically all their new services as private carrier,
the FCC temporarily has avoided the more severe burden of state
regulation. 174 However, if the FCC's promotion of the private car-
rier classification is ever challenged in court, the FCC may be
forced to apply the NARUC I distinction in its proper manner.
1 5
Therefore, a discussion of court decisions regarding the preemption
of less burdensome federal regulation in favor of more onerous
state regulations is necessary.
In Louisiana Public Service Commission v. F.C.C.,176  the
United Stated Supreme Court countenanced state regulation of
common carriers which provide interstate service when it allowed
Louisiana "to depreciate telephone plant and equipment to pre-
serve the state's ratemaking authority over intrastate service. 177
In this decision, the Supreme Court examined Congress' intent in
adopting section 220(b) 7 8 and section 152(b)179 of the Communica-
172. "A state is free to adopt whatever economic policy may reasonably be deemed to
promote the public welfare." Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934).
173. State common carrier regulation effects all common carriers which interconnect
with intrastate service providers.
174. Vertical Blanking Interval Decision, 101 F.C.C.2d 973 (1985).
175. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559 (1982).
176. 106 S. Ct. 1890 (1986).
177. Id. at 1893.
178. 47 U.S.C. § 220(b) (1982). Section 220(b) states:
The Commission shall, as soon as practicable, prescribe for such carriers the
classes of property for which depreciation charges may be properly included
under operating expenses, and the percentages of depreciation which shall be
charged with respect to each of such classes of property, classifying the carriers
as it may deem proper for this purpose. The Commission may, when it deems
necessary, modify the classes and percentages so prescribed. Such carriers shall
not, after the Commission has prescribed the classes of property for which de-
preciation charges may be included, charge to operating expenses any deprecia-
tion charges on classes of property other than those prescribed by the Commis-
sion, or after the Commission has prescribed percentages of depreciation, charge
with respect to any class of property a percentage of depreciation other than
that prescribed therefor by the Commission. No such carrier shall in any case
include in any form under its operating or other expenses any depreciation or
other charge or expenditure included elsewhere as a depreciation charge or oth-
erwise under its operating or other expenses.
Id.
179. 47 U.S.C. § 152(b) (1982). Section 152(b) states, in pertinent part, that "nothing
in this chapter shall be construed to apply or to give the Commission jurisdiction with re-
spect to (1) charges, classifications, practices, services, facilities, or regulations, for or in
[Vol. 6:109
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tions Act of 1934.180 The Court held that "section 220(b), which
deals specifically and expressly with depreciation, does not require
automatic preemption of all state regulation respecting deprecia-
tion."'181 Moreover, the Court concluded that Section 152(b) consti-
tutes a congressional denial of power to the FCC to require state
Commissions to follow FCC depreciation practices for intrastate
rate making purposes."182
In People of the State of California v. FCC,183 the U.S. Court
of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit held that title III of the Communi-
cations Act of 1934,184 which enumerates the special provisions re-
lating to radio, "does not authorize the Commission to preempt
state regulation of intrastate radio common carriage merely be-
cause these regulations may frustrate the entry of FCC licen-
sees."' 8 5 Here, the Court of Appeals had to address the conflicting
connection with intra-state communication service by wire or radio of any carrier." Id.
180. Louisiana Public Service Comm'n v. Fed. Communications Comm'n, 106 S. Ct. at
1897.
181. 106 S. Ct. at 1903.
182. Id. at 1903.
183. 798 F.2d 1515 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
184. Communications Act of 1934, title III, Pub. L. No. 73-416, 48 Stat. 1064, 1081
(1934) (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. §§ 301-399 (1982 & Supp. V 1987)).
185. 798 F.2d at 1520. Certain state statutes demonstrate that state public utility com-
missions are unwilling to ease regulatory burdens on common carriers. For example, a Cali-
fornia statute states:
Every common carrier shall file with the commission and shall print and
keep open to the public inspection schedules showing the rates, fares, charges,
and classifications for the transportation between termini within this state of
persons and property from each point upon its route to all other points thereon;
and from each point upon its route to all points upon every other route leased,
operated, or controlled by it; and from each point on its route or upon any route
leased, operated, or controlled by it to all points upon the route of any other
common carrier, whenever a through route and a joint rate has been established
or ordered between any two such points. If no joint rate over a through route has
been established, the schedules of the several carriers in such through route shall
show the separately established rates, fares, charges, and classifications applica-
ble to the through transportation.
CAL. PUB. UTn. CODE § 486 (West 1975).
A Massachusetts statute states:
All charges made, demanded or received by any common carrier for any service
rendered or performed, or to be rendered or performed by it or in connection
therewith in the conduct of its common carrier business, or made, demanded or
received by any two or more common carriers joining in rendering or performing
any service shall be just and reasonable, and every such common carrier and any
two or more such common carriers joining in rendering or performing any service
shall be entitled to make, demand and receive just and reasonble charges for any
such service, and every unjust or unreasonable charge is hereby prohibited and
declared unlawful; but charges heretofore established and set out in any sched-
ule filed as provided in section nineteen shall be deemed prima facie lawful until
changed or modified by the department under the powers conferred upon it by
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language between sections 152(b).. 6 and 301187 of the Communica-
tions Act. Section 152(b) "reserves to the states jurisdiction over
charges, classifications, practices, services, facilities, or regulations
for, or in connection with, intrastate communication service by
wire or radio of any carrier."'' 8 Section 301, on the other hand,
"directs the FCC to maintain the control of the United States over
all channels of radio transmission.' ' 8 Further, section 301 states
that "no person shall use or operate any apparatus for the [intra-
state, interstate, or foreign] transmission of energy or communica-
tions or signals by radio except under and in accordance with this
chapter and with a license in that behalf granted under the provi-
sions of this chapter.'
190
The Court of Appeals held that section 301 is a general juris-
diction statute and section 152(b) is a limited jurisdiction stat-
ute.191 Consequently, the court found that section 152(b) cannot be
implemented unless there is an implied authority under section
301. Therefore, in interpreting section 152(b), courts must rely on
Congress' intent when it incorporated section 301 into section
152(b).' 92 As noted above, the Court of Appeals held that "the
structure and legislative history of the Act is such that Section 301
does not authorize the FCC to preempt state regulation of intra-
state radio common carriage merely because these regulations may
frustrate the entry of FCC licensees." 193 Despite its holding, the
court nonetheless opined that "[p]ublic interest considerations
may well favor changing the present rules and allowing more com-
plete FCC control over intrastate radio common carriage."' 194 How-
ever, the court concluded that any change must come from Con-
gress, not from the courts, and not from the FCC.' 95 Thus, for now,
this chapter, but this provision shall not give to such rates any greater weight as
evidence of the reasonableness of other rates than they would otherwise have.
MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 159, § 17 (West Supp. 1989).
186. 47 U.S.C. § 152(b) (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
187. 47 U.S.C. § 301 (1982).
188. People of the State of California v. Fed. Communications Comm'n, 798 F.2d
1515, 1517 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Id. A general jurisdiction statute gives the FCC broad power to regulate all radio
transmission. A limited jurisdiction statute acts as an exception to this power by granting
the states power over intrastate radio transmission.
192. People of the State of California, 798 F.2d at 1520; H.R. REP. No. 910, 83d
Cong., 1st Sess. 1953, reprinted in 1954 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS, at 1233.





University of Miami Entertainment & Sports Law Review, Vol. 6, Iss. 1 [1989], Art. 6
http://repository.law.miami.edu/umeslr/vol6/iss1/6
1989] COMMON CARRIER/PRIVATE CARRIER DISTINCTION 137
the courts will prevent federal regulation of interstate common
carriers providing intrastate service and will allow states to regu-
late these common carriers in accordance with their own statutes.
X. THE FUTURE
Congress must amend the Communications Act of 1934 to
drop the NARUC I distinction. Such Congressional action could
prevent a court from ruling that the FCC had to apply the
NAR UC I distinction as it is written in the Communications Act of
1934. Undoubtedly, a ruling of this nature would have an adverse
effect on the deregulatory goals of the FCC, as well as communica-
tions service providers.
Although the FCC recently has set price caps on rates charged
by AT&T, and although it soon may implement the Third Com-
puter Inquiry proposal to allow a competitive and open enhanced
services market for all dominant carriers, the dominant carrier will
still have to file tariffs under Title II. Moreover, although the com-
petitive carrier rulemaking allowed the non-dominant carriers to
forebear from filing tariffs, the FCC will never be able to impose
mandatory forebearance on the non-dominant carriers and, as a re-
sult, they will continue to file tariffs so long as AT&T has a domi-
nant market share.
Obviously, Title II will affect the common carrier regardless of
which approach the FCC takes. For this reason, the FCC should
label a carrier's services private carrier so that Title II regulation
can be avoided by the FCC for administrative purposes and by the
communications service providers for regulatory purposes.' 96
XI. CONCLUSION
The NARUC I distinction will continue to create problems for
the FCC, the courts, and the communications service providers. If
Congress would drop the distinction between common carrier and
private carrier, the definition of common carrier would remain only
technical in nature. For this reason alone, the classification of an
entity as a private carrier would become simpler because of the
clear technical distinction between common carriers and private
carriers.
Until Congress amends the Communications Act of 1934, and
196. However, it must be remembered that, although some states have eased the bur-
den imposed on intrastate common carrier activity, state regulation of intrastate common
carrier regulation remains quite onerous.
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absent judicial intervention, the FCC will continue to undermine
the NARUC I distinction. Furthermore, FCC decisions have actu-
ally created more problems relating to the definition of private car-
rier. In fact, there is a growing resentment by many (pre-FCC cir-
cumvention) providers of common carrier service towards private
carriers. 97 Because of the plethora of problems it has created, Con-
gress must act soon and correct the NARUC I distinction between
common carrier and private carrier.
Michael Jansen*
197. In markets where they actually compete with private carriers, common carriers
have demanded reclassification of private carriers. In fact, in 1982, Congress amended sec-
tion 331 of the Communications Act of 1934 to resolve the private carrier classification
problem anticipated by the NARUC I decision. Pub. L. No. 97-259, 96 Stat. 1087 (1982).
Unfortunately, Congress continued to define private carrier according to its similarities and
dissimilarities to common carriers. In fact, in a recent decision, the FCC rejected the notion
that a carrier already classified as a private carrier in the private land mobile radio service
could be reclassified as a common carrier because it provided service to ineligibles under
Part 90 of the Commission's Rules. In the Matter of Paul Kelley d/b/a American Teletronix,
Licensee of Station WNHM 552, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 3 FCC Rcd 5347 (1988).
In this case, a private carrier licensee had asked the Commission for a declaratory ruling
urging that his private carrier paging system should be allowed to maintain its private car-
rier status and thus avoid common carrier regulation. Id. at 5347. A competing radio com-
mon carrier opposed the petition arguing that the licensee was advertising himself as a com-
mon carrier and also serviced many ineligibles. Id. The FCC concluded that once the carrier
has been classified as a private carrier, the only event allowing reclassification of the carrier
as a common carrier would be the carrier's reselling the services of a common carrier for
profit. Id.
* Michael Jansen would like to thank Professor Lili Levi of the University of Miami
School of Law for her assistance and encouragement. Mr. Jansen currently is practicing
communications law in Washington, D.C.
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